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CURRENT ISSUES IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson' recognized two forms of sexual harassment actionable under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:2 Quid pro quo 3 and hostile
environment.4 However, the Court refused to address the issue of
1. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1). See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
3. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(a)(2)(1995). Quid pro quo harassment occurs when a job
benefit or privilege is conditioned on an employee's toleration of sexual harassment. Id.
Although quid pro quo harassment usually involves an employer making unwelcome
sexual advances or requests for sexual favors as a condition ofjob benefits, explicit sexual
advances and requests are not the only forms of sexual harassment that may constitute quid
pro quo harassment. See, e.g., Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 885 F. Supp. 495, 498
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that a plaintiff may state a claim for quid pro quo sexual
harassment if her job benefits were "contingent upon submission to sexual harassment,"
citing Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 577 (2d Cir. 1989)).
The issue in a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim is not whether the supervisor made
sexual advances toward an employee, but whether a "tangible job benefit or privilege is
conditioned on an employee's submission to sexual blackmail." Carrero, 890 F.2d at 579.
4. Metitor, 477 U.S. at 65. Hostile environment harassment recognizes that Title VII
also allows employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult. Id.
In the wake of Meritor, circuit courts have applied the following requirements for
hostile work environment sexual harassment: (1) the plaintiff must belong to a protected
class; (2) the plaintiff must have been subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the
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employer liability.5 In a quid pro quo harassment claim, if the court
recognizes a violation, then the court will hold the employer strictly
liable.6 The courts have yet to adopt a clear legal standard for holding
an employer liable for hostile environment sexual harassment claims.7
Part II of this Section focuses on hostile environment sexual harassment
and whether individuals should be held liable. This Section argues for
an interpretation of employer that includes supervisors and others with
"employer-like" responsibilities!
A second unresolved issue in sexual harassment law concerns the
role of the First Amendment in hostile environment cases.9 Recently,
some defendants have argued"° that Title VII unconstitutionally permits
a victim of sexual harassment to state a claim based entirely upon words
harassment must have been based on sex; (4) the harassment must have unreasonably
interfered with the plaintiff's work performance; and (5) the employer must have known
or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt action. See, e.g.,
Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777 (1st Cir. 1990).
5. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
6. Frederick J. Lewis & Thomas L. Henderson, Employer Liability for "Hostile Work
Environment" Sexual Harassment Created by Supervisors: The Search for an Appropriate
Standard, 25 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 667, 670 n.5 (1994) (listing various decisions).
Although the issue of employer liability discussed in part II.B may apply to both forms
of sexual harassment, this Section will focus on the recent developments in the law
concerning employer liability and hostile environment sexual harassment claims. For
recent cases discussing employer liability and quid pro quo sexual harassment claims, see
Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 514 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding the employer liable for
supervisor's conduct); Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assocs., 30 F.3d 1350, 1361-62 (1 1th Cir.
1994) (applying agency principles to hold corporation liable for sexual harassment by its
contracted management company); Johnson v. Indopco, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 670, 674 (N.D.
111. 1994) (considering all defendant's sexual and suggestive comments together when
examining whether plaintiffalleged enough facts to establish respondeat superior liability).
7. See Lewis & Thomas, supra note 6, at 670 (identifying the various legal standards).
8. See infra part II.B.
9. See infra part III.
10. For a discussion on the First Amendment defense see generally Kingsley R.
Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First
Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481,531 (1991) (arguing "the current interpretation of Title
VII cannot withstand scrutiny under modem First Amendment doctrine"); Jules B. Gerard,
The First Amendment in a Hostile Work Environment: A Primer on Free Speech and
Sexual Harassment, 68 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1003, 1033 (1993) (concluding that speech
protected under the First Amendment should not be allowed to demonstrate a hostile
environment sexual harassment claim).
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and symbolic expression." Part III analyzes the fallacy of such an
argument and explains the negative effects that such a view of hostile
environment sexual harassment would have on the workplace. 2
I. INDIVIDUAL LIABIITY OF AGENTS UNDER TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196413 prohibits an employer
from discriminating against an employee because of the individual's
sex. 4 Title VII defines employer as "a person engaged in an industry
... who has fifteen or more employees ... and any agent of such
person."' 5  Title VII, however, does not define agent. When an
employee establishes a Title VII violation, federal courts usually hold the
employer liable for the supervisor's illegal conduct.' 6  Federal courts
may also hold employers liable for the acts of their employees occurring
outside the scope of their employment. 7 However, whether an agent
or employee who harasses other employees may be held individually
liable is an issue that is currently dividing the federal courts.' Literal
application of Title VII's definition of employer would extend liability
to any individual employee who violates Title VII. For now, Congress
has left the question of individual liability for non-employers to the
federal courts. 9
11. See, e.g,, DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 596-97
(5th Cir. 1995). For a discussion of the DeAngelis case, see infra notes 69-72 and
accompanying text.
12. See infra part III.
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
14. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
15. Id. § 2000e-(b). An "employer" is defined in Title VII as:
"a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees
for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
year, and any agent of such person." Id. (emphasis added).
16. For a discussion of the different standards used to determine employer liability, see
Lewis & Thomas, supra note 6, at 673-87. Victims may sue for compensatory and
punitive damages, see Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1981a-(b)(1), or
seek equitable relief, such as back pay, reinstatement, or injunction. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958) (discussing an employer's
liability under common law agency principles).
18. See infra notes 20-43 and accompanying text.
19. See infra part II.A.
1996]
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A. Confusion in the Courts
Some courts hold Title VII imposes liability broadly not only on
actual employers, but also on individual supervisors or management
personnel who sexually harass co-employees. 0 In Johnson v. Universi-
ty Surgical Group Associates of Cincinnati," a dental assistant sued
both her supervisor and the medical practice for which she worked,
alleging that she was sexually harassed on the job.22 The court for the
Southern District of Ohio acknowledged that neither the Sixth Circuit nor
the United States Supreme Court had spoken definitively on the issue of
individual liability under Title VII0 However, the court noted a case
in which the Sixth Circuit upheld a lower court's award of damages
against individuals for sexual discrimination as tacit approval of
individual liability.24 After conducting its own analysis, the court held
the co-employee supervisor liable under Title VII for his individual acts
of intentional discrimination2
In its analysis, the Johnson court examined the language of Title
VII, the express intent of Congress, and the Supreme Court's language
in Meritor.2 6  First, the court noted that Title VII explicitly assigns
20. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding supervisors
liable when they ignored racist antics and intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff);
Gregory v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 896 F. Supp. 78 (D. Conn. 1994) (finding a
manager and a supervisor individually liable under Title VII for sexual harassment);
Johnson v. University Surgical Assocs. of Cincinnati, 871 F. Supp 979 (S.D. Ohio 1994)
(holding a supervisor individually liable under Title VII); Griffith v. Keystone Steel &
Wire Co., 858 F. Supp. 802 (C.D. III. 1994) (holding individual employees liable under
Title VII); Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F. Supp. 1536 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding managing agent
liable under Title VII).
21. 871 F. Supp. 979 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
22. Id. at 980. The sole issue for the court was whether the plaintiff's co-employee
supervisor could be held liable under Title VII for his sexual harassment of her and for the
retaliatory termination. Id. at 981.
23. Id. at 981, 983.
24. Id. at 984 (citing Romain v. Kurek, 772 F.2d 281, 282 (6th Cir. 1985)). See
generally Scott B. Goldberg, Comment, Discrimination by Managers and Supervisors:
Recognizing Agent Liability Under Title VII, 143 U. PA. L. REv 571 (1994).
25. Johnson, 871 F. Supp. at 987. See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text for
the court's analysis.
26. Johnson, 871 F. Supp. at 985-86. See also infra part ll.B (discussing a similar
analysis).
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liability to employers and agents of employers.27 Second, the court
found that Congress expressly intended to provide "appropriate remedies"
for victims of sexual harassment.28 The Johnson court concluded that
in certain instances denying individual liability for a co-worker
supervisor might leave the plaintiff without a remedy, which would
subvert the remedial purpose of Title VII. 29 Third, the court examined
the Meritor opinion which has suggested that courts should follow
agency principles when determining a supervisor's liability under Title
VII.10
At the other extreme are courts that strictly apply respondeat
superior principles and refuse to hold individuals liable under Title
VII.3' These courts narrowly construe the term employer and hold
individuals do not fit within Title VII's definition of employer. 2 In
doing so, these courts interpret the word agent in Title VIU as imputing
the discriminatory acts of individual non-employers to the employing
agency, thereby making the employer the only suable entity.33
The Ninth Circuit has been the most adamant in its refusal to allow
individual liability for non-employers. In Miller v. Maxwell's Interna-
tional, Inc.,34 the plaintiff brought discrimination claims against six
defendants in their individual capacities.35 Like the court in Johnson,
27. Johnson, 871 F. Supp. at 985.
28. Id. The court noted that in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress extended Title
VII remedies to include compensatory and punitive damages. Id.
29. Id. at 986. Specifically, the Johnson court examined Kauffman v. Allied Signal,
Inc., 970 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1992) in which the "Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal of her hostile environment claim because 'Allied Signal was protected from
liability because its response upon learning of [the supervisor's] harassment was adequate
and effective."' Id. at 986 (quoting Kauffman, 970 F.2d at 185).
30. Johnson, 871 F. Supp. at 986.
31. See, e.g., Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993)
(limiting Title VII liability to respondeat superior principles); Busby v. City of Orlando,
931 F.2d 764, 772 (11 th Cir. 1991) (holding a suit against the employee as agent is a suit
against the employer); Redman v. Lima City Sch. Dist. Bd., 889 F. Supp. 288, 292 (N.D.
Ohio 1995) (same); Gastineau v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 884 F. Supp. 310, 312 (S.D. Ind.
1994) (finding individual liability inconsistent with the remedial scheme of Title VII).
32. See Miller, 991 F.2d at 587-88.
33. Id. at 588.
34. 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993).
35. Id. at 584. The defendants were the CEO of Maxwell's International, two general
managers of the restaurant, and three lower level employees. Id.
1996]
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the Ninth Circuit looked to Title VII's statutory scheme to determine
whether Congress intended individual liability.36 The Miller court
reasoned that by limiting Title VII liability to employers with fifteen or
more employees, Congress intended to protect small entities from the
costs associated with litigating discrimination claims.37 Therefore, the
court concluded it was "inconceivable" that Congress intended to hold
individual employees liable.38 Moreover, the court refused to expand
the liability of individual employees beyond respondeat superior
principles.39
Still other courts have chosen to take the middle ground between
Johnson and Miller, and instead examine the non-employer's authority
over the harassed employee. 40 In Ball v. Renner,41 the Tenth Circuit
imposed strict liability upon certain supervisors and managerial
employees if they exercised "employer-like authority."'42 However, if
the court finds that certain employees do not have enough power over the
plaintiff's employment, they will not be held individually liable under
Title VII. 43
36. Id. at 587.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 587.
39. Miller, 991 F.2d at 588.
40. Compare Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 442-43 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding
supervisors in charge of staffing and assignments to be agents and therefore individually
liable) with Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 651-52 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the
branch manager of a private employer could be sued only in his official capacity).
Compare Cross v. Alabama, 65 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1290, 1300-01 (11 th Cir.
1994) (holding that an employee-agent may be sued in his individual capacity under Title
VII) with Quillen v. American Tobacco Co., 874 F. Supp. 1285, 1296 (M.D. Ala. 1995)
(holding that an employee-agent may not be sued in his individual capacity, and arguing
that Cross "made a sharp departure from past precedent").
41. 54 F.3d 664 (10th Cir. 1995).
42. Id. at 667-68 (defining employer to mean those "who exercise employer-like
functions vis-A-vis the employees who complain of those persons' unlawful conduct"). See
also Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989) (concluding the agency
language used in Title VII's definition of employer indicates Congress' intent to impose
personal liability on individuals who serve in supervisory positions and exercise
"significant control" over hiring, firing, and conditions of employment).
43. See, e.g., Ball, 54 F.3d at 668. In Ball, a police dispatcher brought a Title VII
action against the city and against the police officer who allegedly sexually harassed her.
Id. at 664-65. The district court granted summary judgment for both the city and the
police officer. Id. at 664. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit, after admitting "the waters are
not entirely clear" on the issue of individual liability, stated that the relationship between
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol50/iss1/16
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B. The Correct Solution: Imposing Individual Liability on "Agents"
Courts that argue that the word agent incorporates the doctrine of
respondeat superior fail to recognize that agent liability appears in the
plain language of Title VII.M Because employers must act through its
agents,45 a statute prohibiting discrimination by an employer necessarily
includes respondeat superior principles.46 Therefore, there would be no
reason for Congress to include the word agent in the definition of the
term employer. Yet Title VII specifically identifies agent as a suable and
separate entity.47 Congress must have included agent so as to impose
individual liability upon non-employer agents!'
The Miller court's reasoning is flawed in other respects as well.
The Ninth Circuit wrongly assumed that because Congress limited Title
VII's coverage to large employers, it must have also intended to excuse
individual discriminators from liability.4 9 However, the legislative
history indicates Congress excluded small employers from Title VII to
immunize family-run businesses that hire friends and family members,
the plaintiff and the employee needed to be equivalent to an employer-employee relation-
ship in order to trigger individual liability. Id. at 667-68. The court concluded the
plaintiff failed to show such a relationship existed. Id. at 668.
44. See supra note 15 for the definition of employer. See also Ball, 54 F.3d at 667
(arguing that using respondeat superior principles to impose Title VII liability only on the
actual employer "makes little sense in analytical terms").
45. Ball, 54 F.3d at 667.
46. Id. (noting that by definition a corporate employer can act only through its agents:
"[W]hat other meaning can be given to the concept that [the corporation] has engaged in
employment discrimination?").
47. See supra note 15 fbr the definition of employer.
48. Courts that oppose individual liability argue that had Congress intended to provide
for such liability, it would have substituted the word "person" for the word employer. See
Gastineau v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 884 F. Supp. 310, 312 (S.D. id. 1994).
49. Goldberg, supra note 24, at 577-78. The Miller court's reasoning is as follows:
Title VII limits liability to employers with fifteen or more employees .... in part
because Congress did not want to burden small entities with the costs associated with
litigating discrimination claims. If Congress decided to protect small entities with
limited resources from liability, it is inconceivable that Congress intended to allow
civil liability to run against individual employees.
Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587"(9th Cir. 1993).
19961
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not to shield individual sexual harassers from liability.50
Furthermore, as the Johnson court argued, imposing individual
liability on agents promotes the objectives of Title VII.5' There are two
primary objectives of Title VII: eliminating discrimination from the
workplace and compensating victims.52 Permitting liability for non-
employer individuals would further Title VII's objectives by providing
compensation for victims when they cannot sue their employers53 or
when they are discouraged from suing their employers.54
Finally, in Meritor, the Supreme Court suggested lower courts apply
agency principles when determining employer liability under Title VII.55
Because the law of agency recognizes personal liability for agents,56 it
seems logical that the Supreme Court would impose individual liability
if faced with this issue.
III. SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. History of the First Amendment Defense
in Hostile Environment Cases
Scholars have recently begun to argue that hostile environment
claims are inconsistent with modem First Amendment doctrine.57 They
50. Goldberg, supra note 24, at 578 (citing Lamirande v. Resolution Trust Corp., 834
F. Supp. 526, 528 (D.N.H. 1993).
51. Johnson v. University Surgical Assocs., 871 F. Supp. 979 (S.D. Ohio 1994). See
also Goldberg, supra note 24, at 580-87.
52. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
53. Goldberg, supra note 24, at 583. Goldberg notes that suing bankrupt employers
or others who lack sufficient funds may be "monetarily fruitless." Id. See also Johnson,
871 F. Supp. at 985-86 (suggesting that an employee may not have a remedy if the
employer was not liable because the employer's response to the harassment was effective).
54. Goldberg, supra note 24, at 583-84. Goldberg explains that employees would
often rather sue agents than an employer, either out of fear of the consequences, or simply
because the agents are more responsible. Id.
55. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
56. The Restatement (Second) of Agency provides that a "[p]rincipal and agent can
be joined in one action for a wrong resulting from the tortious conduct of an agent.., and
a judgment can be rendered against each." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 359c(l) (1958). See also Gastineau v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 884 F. Supp. 310, 313
(S.D. Ind. 1994) (conceding that its refusal to allow agent liability "creates some tension
with" Mertor).
57. See, e.g., Gerard, supra note 10, at 1004-07. The EEOC regulations define sexual
harassment as "other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature." 29 C.F.R.
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argue that the speech involved in harassment cases is protected under the
First Amendment and that any restriction of that speech is viewpoint-
based and thus unconstitutional s Defendants in hostile environment
sexual harassment cases are using this argument when faced with a claim
that rests on speech or symbolic expression."
Scholars and defendants who assert that Title VII unconstitutionally
restricts speech often focus on the EEOC Guidelines.60 These Guide-
lines specify that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination
prohibited under Title VII.6 ' The Guidelines emphasize that in deter-
mining whether sexual harassment exists, the trier of fact must examine
"the record as a whole" and "the totality of the circumstances," including
the nature of any sexual advances and the context in which they oc-
curred.62 Since the passage of Title VII, the courts have used these
Guidelines as a basis for determining if sexual harassment took place.63
In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,64 the defendant raised this
defense, but the court found it unsound.65 The Robinson court recog-
nized that authority existed to support the defendant's contention that
sexually-oriented pictures and sexual remarks alone cannot form the basis
for Title VII liability.' The court nevertheless rejected the defendant's
§ 1604.11I(a) (1995).
58. See Gerard, supra note 10, at 1007-10 (discussing the First Amendment). The
First Amendment prohibits the government from regulating speech based on the contents
of the speech. Id. at 1007. This principle prevents the government from censoring speech.
Id.
59. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla.
1991). See also J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches
to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 414-28 (predicting an increase in the
number of First Amendment defenses).
60. See, e.g., Gerard, supra note 10, at 1033-34 (concluding that the Guidelines are
"probably unconstitutional" as substantially overbroad and are often applied unconstitu-
tionally).
61. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11.
62. Id. The kind of workplace conduct that may be actionable includes "[u]nwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature." Id. § 1604.11(a).
63. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
64. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
65. Id. at 1534-36.
66. Id. at 1525 (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986)).
1996]
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argument,67 because the work environment, viewed as a whole, was
abusive and hostile.68
However, in 1995, the Fifth Circuit did not dismiss the defendant's
First Amendment argument as easily as the Robinson court did. In
DeAngelis v. El Paso Municipal Police Officers Association,69 the
defendant appealed the jury's finding of sexual harassment, claiming,
inter alia, the verdict abridged his First Amendment free speech
rights.7" The First Circuit reversed the district court's judgment after
it found the evidence insufficient to support the jury's verdict.7
Unfortunately, the court limited its analysis to the insufficiency of the
evidence making it difficult to determine whether the First Amendment
defense actually played in its decision.72
The First Amendment argument rests on the assertion that the EEOC
67. Id. at 1525-27. In doing so, the court relied on the Eleventh Circuit precedent to
reject the "social context" argument relied upon in other circuits. Id. at 1526. The social
context argument, relied upon by such courts as the Sixth Circuit in Rabidue, is that
Congress did not design Title VII to change the existing social contexts of certain work
environments. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 621. Such environments include those in which
"[s]exual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines may abound." Id. at 620-21.
The Robinson court, however, concluded that "the Rabidue analysis violates the most basic
tenet of the hostile work environment cause of action, the necessity of examining the
totality of the circumstances." Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1527.
68. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1527. The environment included sexual remarks, sexual
jokes, and sexually-oriented pictures of women posted in supervisors' offices and central
gathering places around the shipyard. Id. at 1491-1503.
69. 51 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 1995).
70. Id. at 593.
71. Id. at 597. The DeAngelis court characterized the evidence supporting the sexual
harassment case as "a few written jibes, at women and police officers generally and the
plaintiff in particular, published in the police association newsletter." Id. at 592. Even
though 1,000 copies of the newsletter were printed monthly, and distributed to at least 700
police officer members of the Association, the court found that the columns "were not
severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment."
Id. at 595-96 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67, and Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370). The court
noted that after Harris, "sexually discriminatory verbal intimidation, ridicule and insults
may be sufficiently severe or pervasive to ... create an abusive working environment,"
and warned that an extremely high standard must be met ("a series of criteria that express
extremely insensitive conduct against women, conduct so egregious as to alter the
conditions of employment and destroy their equal opportunity in the workplace") before
a hostile work environment exists. Id. at 593.
72. Although the court found the evidence to be "rife ... with first amendment
overtones" it limited its holding to the sufficiency of the evidence issue. DeAngelis, 51
F.3d at 592.
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Guidelines discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.73 Under the Guide-
lines, a particular type of speech (i.e., speech that forms a basis for
sexual harassment) is singled out and may be restricted and/or punished,
whereas any other kind of speech (i.e., words of encouragement) is
permissible in the workplace.74 Hence, this amounts to blatant view-
point discrimination."
Although viewpoint restrictions on speech are in some cases
constitutional, the Guidelines do not fit into any of the four exceptions
for permissible content regulation: advocating illegal conduct, libel,
obscenity, and "fighting words., 76 If a viewpoint-based law does not
fit easily into one of the non-protected categories, it will be strictly
scrutinized.77 For the proponents of the First Amendment defense, the
analysis ends there7' because the Guidelines do not fit neatly into any
category. 79 Nevertheless, courts have difficulty in affirming the First
Amendment defense.'
73. Gerard, supra note 10, at 1010.
74. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
75. Gerard, supra note 10, at 1010 ("The government's interest in the hostile-
environment cases is entirely one of suppressing offensive or disagreeable ideas ... ").
76. See id. at 10 10-25 (analyzing the Guidelines under each category of permissible
content regulation).
77. Id. at 1010. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text for further discussion
and criticism of this point.
78. Gerard, supra note 10, at 1033-35.
79. Id. Professor Gerard characterizes hostile-environment law as "overbreadth run
amok." Id. at 1028. The overbreadth principles of First Amendment jurisprudence work
to strike down legislation that covers too much speech (i.e., speech that may be regulated
as well as speech that is constitutionally protected). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991).
Professor Gerard is apparently concerned that restricting speech in the workplace
potentially allows government officials to abuse their discretion by vastly suppressing any
and all information they so desire. Gerard, supra note 10, at 1007 (arguing that "[i]f
government could regulate speech because of its content, officials could outlaw all speech
on whatever topics they chose and could suppress information they would rather conceal
or points of view with which they disagree"). Such a slippery slope argument is
inappropriate in the hostile environment sexual harassment context where courts require
the harassment to be frequent, severe, or pervasive. See Meitor Say. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
80. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
1996]
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B. The Fallacy of the First Amendment Defense
for Hostile Work Environment Claims
Modem First Amendment doctrine subjects viewpoint-based
restrictions to the strictest scrutiny."' Courts will only uphold a
restriction on speech if the regulation serves a compelling governmental
interest and it is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.82 Courts must
guard against a government that attempts to usurp power by censoring
particular ideas or by preventing public access to government criti-
cism.8 3  However, Title VII does not pose these dangers because
Congress, when it designed Title VII, had a compelling governmental
interest to prevent discrimination and harassment in the workplace.' 4
Congress did not design Title VII as a means to censor viewpoints."
Moreover, modem First Amendment doctrine allows restrictions of
many types of speech, even when the restrictions are viewpoint-based.86
For example, certain labor laws, 7 regulations of bribery and threats, and
81. Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, No. 95-2009, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS
11837, at *11-*12 (1 lth Cir. May 23, 1996) (noting viewpoint discrimination is a form of
content discrimination, which is subject to strict scrutiny (citing United States v. Kokinda,
497 U.S. 720, 726-27 (1990))).
82. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2549-50 (1990). See Gerard, supra
note 10, at 1007-08 (discussing Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951)). The
Niemotko case involved a permit to use a public park. Niemotko, 340 U.S. at 269-70. The
officials in charge of issuing the permits allowed certain uses of the park, but denied
Jehovah's Witnesses from obtaining a permit. Id. The court held this to be a prior
restraint on the Jehovah Witnesses and therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 273. However,
the Niemotko case is easily distinguishable from a Title VII hostile environment claim
because Title VII claims fit better into the "time, place and manner" category of First
Amendment jurisprudence. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (discussing time, place, and manner). See also infra notes 110-13 and
accompanying text (discussing time, place, and manner).
83. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986
DuKE L.J. 589, 610-613 (examining the rationale for judicial hostility towards viewpoint
restrictions).
84. See supra text accompanying note 52.
85. See supra text accompanying note 52.
86. See Sunstein, supra note 83, at 613. Sunstein notes that "[r]egulation based on
point of view is common in the law. The terms 'viewpoint-based' and 'viewpoint-neutral'
often represent conclusions rather than analytical tools." Id. at 616.
87. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). In Gissel, the
Supreme Court upheld certain restrictions on an employer's speech before a union election
because certain statements might be misinterpreted by employees as a threat of retaliation.
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restrictions on false or misleading commercial speech are all viewpoint-
based, yet are all constitutional.s These regulations serve a compelling
government interest because Congress designed them in order to prevent
substantial harms.89 Similarly, combating sexual harassment in the
workplace is a compelling government interest and should withstand any
First Amendment attack.9
Proponents of the First Amendment defense to hostile environment
sexual harassment claims, however, omit several factors which deserve
a place in the analysis. 9' These include the purposes and public
policies underlying Title VII,92 which is to punish discriminatory
Id. at 618. In so holding, the Court acknowledged that even truthful statements may be
perceived as threatening to employees due to the disparity of power between employers
and employees. Id.
There are similarities between such labor disputes described in Gissel and hostile work
environment cases. Nevertheless, some authors attempt to distinguish the two types of
cases on the basis that sexual "[h]arassment by coworkers ... does not involve [the]
imbalance in power [which is involved in labor cases]." Browne, supra note 10, at 515.
Arguments such as this one ignore the inherent inequality between the genders in the
workplace; inequality which sexual harassment laws were designed to eradicate. See, e.g.,
Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. 111. 988) (discussing the imbalance of
power in sexual harassment claims).
88. Sunstein, supra note 83, at 613-14.
89. Id. at 614-15.
90. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535 (M.D. Fla.
1991) (stating that "[the eradication of workplace discrimination is more than simply a
legitimate governmental interest, it is a compelling governmental interest"). See also
Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (affirming that the state
has a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women); Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474,481 (1988) (upholding content-based restrictions where there is a compelling
state interest) (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
See also Sarah E. Bums, Evidence of a Sexually Hostile Workplace: What is it and How
Should it be Assessed After Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.?, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 357,415 (1995) (arguing that "[the free speech defense fails to acknowledge that
a compelling government interest may counterbalance the First Amendment concerns [and
that] [t]he elimination of employment discrimination should be regarded as such a
compelling government interest").
91. See generally Aileen V. Kent, Note, First Amendment Defense to Hostile Work
Environment Sexual Harassment: Does Discriminatory Conduct Deserve Constitutional
Protection?, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 513 (1994).
92. For a discussion of the purposes underlying Title VII, see text accompanying supra
note 52.
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conduct, not speech.93 One objective of Title VII is to compensate the
victim,94 therefore, the evidence must be weighed partially in terms of
the harm to that victim.95 In Harris, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that
the environment as a whole must be considered when determining
whether a hostile or abusive work environment exists.96 Consequently,
if a First Amendment defense were allowed to stand, evidence of the
expressive conduct which created the hostile environment would be
moot. Defendants could easily destroy many harassment claims and hide
their discriminatory conduct behind the cloak of the First Amendment.97
93. See Keith R. Fentonmiller, Note, Verbal Sexual Harassment as Equality-Depriving
Conduct, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 565, 574-75 (1994). Mr. Fentonmiller states:
Degrading comments and epithets based on sex have meaning beyond the dictionary
definitions of their linguistic parts. Their use captures a painful historical context of
powerlessness, rape, and lack of legal and social identity... [a]lthough such words
literally express hatred in a gender-specific way, their true power lies in their ability
to invoke instantaneously an entire history of subjugation, as well as the present day
realities of rape, incest, and domestic violence.
Id.
94. See supra text accompanying note 52.
95. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). In Harris, the Supreme Court
held that:
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or
abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview. Likewise, if the victim does not
subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually
altered the conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title VII violation.
Id. at 370 (emphasis added). See also Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim's Story, in WORDs THAT WOUND (1993) (urging courts to focus
on the effects of racist speech).
96. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
97. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Andrea Dworkin at 18-19, Hudnut v. American
Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (No. 85-1090). Dworkin notes:
All any exploiter has to do is to interject speech into any practice of exploitation,
however malignant, and hide the whole practice behind the First Amendment. By
isolating the speech elements in other practices of discrimination and asserting their
absolute protection, the discrimination can be made to disappear. Consider, for
example, a common situation in sexual harassment in employment, where a 'speech'
element ... is part of a chain of events leading to an adverse employment
consequence.... No court has held that the mere presence of words in the process
of discrimination turns the discrimination into protected activity.
Id. at 18-19. See also Amy Horton, Comment, Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and
Censorship: Sexual Harassment, the First Amendment, and the Contours of Title VII, 46
U. MIAMI L. REv. 403, 430 (1992) (noting that an employer who defends a hostile
environment claim on First Amendment grounds is "simply defending its right to plenary
control of the workplace").
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Furthermore, proponents of the First Amendment defense in hostile
environment sexual harassment cases "mischaracterize" the harm
resulting from verbal sexual harassment.98 Sexual harassment goes
beyond "mere offense" or emotional distress: it furthers an institution of
degradation and disempowerment-a system in which women are inferior
to men." Allowing sexually harassing speech to invade the workplace
disadvantages victims economically, by directly interfering with their
ability to perform their jobs."° Refusing to regulate such speech
systematically perpetuates the subordination of women in the
workforce.'
These proponents also overestimate the "chilling effect" that Title
VII has and will have on protected speech. 02 The only speech restrict-
98. Fentonmiller, supra note 93, at 569-73 (arguing that equality interests outweigh
First Amendment interests in the hostile environment sexual harassment context). See also
Ann E. Cudd, When Sexual Harassment is Protected Speech: Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment Policy in the University, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 69, 73 (1994) (describing
sexual harassment as being "about domination ... not a kind of 'mere offense' like
witnessing someone doing something obscene or scatological in nature"); Suzanne Sangree,
Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment and the First
Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 461, 532-58 (1995) (arguing that
the hostile work environment debate should focus on recognizing women's continuing
subjection to sex discrimination in the workplace).
99. Fentonmiller, supra note 93, at 574-81. Mr. Fentonmiller describes sexual
harassment as coercion, and notes that courts also regard it as such:
The correlation between verbal sexual harassment in the workplace and the economic
displacement and sexual degradation of its victims is so strong that courts presume
discriminatory intent-a requirement for recovery under Title VII--from the presence
of sexually derogatory words and expression.
Innumerable combinations of words exist which can degrade and disempower in
an instant. Because sexually harassing words immediately invoke a context, history,
and a set of stereotyped assumptions about women, they often are perceived as
threats by women. A woman can never be certain that harassing words will not
escalate into more harassing words or physical assault.
Id. at 577 (footnotes omitted).
100. See Jay W. Waks & Michael G. Starr, The "Sexual Shakedown" in Perspective:
Sexual Harassment in its Social and Legal Contexts, 7 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 567, 570-71
(1982) (explaining the adverse economic consequences of sexual harassment).
101. See Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
1, 14 (1990) (commenting that "sexist speech reinstitutionalizes barriers in the workplace
based on gender").
102. Sangree, supra note 98, at 532-36. Professor Sangree also asserts that these
commentators "underestimate the forces working against regulation of harassment in the
workplace." Id. at 534 (emphasis added).
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ed by hostile environment sexual harassment law is discriminatory speech
within the employment context. °3 As noted above, it is always in an
employer's best interest to maintain a non-abusive work environ-
ment.'" Thus, when the government's interests are balanced with an
individual's First Amendment interests, the possibility that some
discriminatory speech will be prohibited must yield to the compelling
state goal of eliminating sexual harassment in the workplace.0 5
Yet, the question remains as to what happens when a statute aimed
at discriminatory conduct incidentally interferes with a person's right to
free speech? In dictum, the Supreme Court recently tried to shed some
light on this difficult issue of First Amendment jurisprudence. In R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul,"6 the Court struck down an ordinance that
criminalized the display of any symbol which the defendant knew or
"had reason to know would arouse[ ] anger, alarm, or resentment in
others bas[ed] on race, color, creed, religion, or gender."' 07 A majority
of the Court found the ordinance an unconstitutional, viewpoint-based
restriction of speech. 08 In striking the ordinance down, the Court
specifically stated that its holding would not apply to statutes, such as
Title VII, which are designed to regulate conduct because government
interference with such speech would merely be a "secondary effect" of
the statute.0 9
103. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a). Courts have often held would-be protected speech
may be regulated within the employment context. See, e.g., Snell v. Suffolk County, 611
F. Supp. 521, 528 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating "[tihe workplace is different because it is
governed by Congress' mandate that discrimination in employment will no longer be
tolerated in this country").
104. See Waks & Starr, supra note 100, at 569-70. See supra note 100 and
accompanying text.
105. See Sangree, supra note 98, at 534-35. As Professor Sangree states, "is the
tradeoff between allowing some speech to be curtailed while furthering employment
equality a positive one for democracy, and, thus, a positive tradeoff in terms of the First
Amendment?" Id. at 535.
106. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
107. Id. at 2547. The defendant allegedly burned a cross on the property of a black
family that lived across the street from him. Id. at 2541.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2546. Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion, responded to the
concern that the opinion would make hostile work environment claims unconstitutional:
[S]ince words can in some circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but
against conduct (a law against treason, for example, is violated by telling the enemy
the nation's defense secrets), a particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable
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The secondary effect distinction is critical. If a regulation that
prohibits speech in the workplace is understood to have a secondary
effect of preventing sexual harassment, then that regulation must be
analyzed under this "time, place, and manner" exception of the First
Amendment."' Time, place, and manner restrictions constitute a
distinct category of First Amendment jurisprudence in which a lower
level of scrutiny applies."' Clearly, the primary purpose of sexual
harassment legislation is to eliminate gender-based discrimination in the
workplace." 2 How else can the consequent restriction of speech be
characterized if not as a secondary effect of such legislation?".
Finally, opponents of the First Amendment defense can argue that
victims of sexually harassing speech in the workplace are a "captive
class of speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at
conduct rather than speech.... Thus, for example, sexually derogatory "fighting
words," among other words, may produce a violation of Title VII's general
prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment practices....
Id. at 2546.
The Court stated that the ordinance in R.A.V., on the other hand, was meant to
impermissibly prosecute speech which the First Amendment is meant to protect. Id. at
2547-50. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First
Amendment Dog That Didn't Bark 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 11 (commenting that the case
indicates "a general acceptance that at least the main elements of the hostile environment
cause of action should survive First Amendment challenge"). But see Jeffrey M. Laurence,
Comment, Minnesota Burning: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul and First Amendment
Precedent, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1117, 1143-46 (1994) (arguing that the majority's
conception of Title VII as constitutional under the "secondary effects" doctrine is
incorrect).
110. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(recognizing that a state may "enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of
expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication");
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (setting the standard for time,
place, and manner regulations by requiring a legitimate governmental interest unrelated to
the suppression of speech, content neutrality, and a tailoring of the means to accomplish
this interest).
I 1. See Perry Educ. Ass "n, 460 U.S. at 45. See also Strauss, supra note 101, at 14
("[B]anning sexist speech in the workplace does not censor such speech everywhere and
for all time.").
112. See supra text accompanying note 52.
113. In contrast, commentators such as Browne reach a different conclusion. Browne
argues that "if the reaction of the audience is considered a 'secondary effect' of
expression, then virtually any restriction of expression can be justified." Browne, supra
note 10, at 522. The argument, however, is not that the victim's reaction is secondary,
but rather that the restriction on speech itself is secondary.
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audience," thus allowing for less stringent scrutiny of Title VII. 14
When the expression of another forces an unwilling person" 5 to view
or listen to that expression, then the captive audience doctrine allows
restrictions on speech." 6 Proponents of the First Amendment defense
in hostile work environment cases argue that the captive audience theory
applies exclusively to the home." 7 On the contrary, simply because
the Supreme Court has not yet held employees in the workplace as a
captive audience does not mean that employees do not fit within the
category." 8
IV. CONCLUSION
As courts struggle with the recent issues concerning hostile work
environment sexual harassment, it will behoove them to consider the
congressional purposes behind Title VII. Individual liability furthers
these goals by offering victims recovery where suing the employer is
either impossible or less desirable. Perhaps more importantly, individual
liability allows the victim the opportunity to confront her harasser,
thereby granting victims emotional as well as financial compensation.
The objectives of eliminating discrimination in the workplace and
compensating the victims of such discrimination also deserve consider-
ation when courts are faced with the First Amendment defense. Sexually
abusive speech must be examined in light of the historical and social
context in which the speech occurred and in conjunction with any harm
it causes. When such interests are balanced against the minor chilling
114. See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA &MELVILLE B. NIMMER, SMOLLA & NIMMER
ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1.02(F) (1984).
115. Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) ("Mhe degree of
captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.").
116. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding an ordinance which
restricts picketing in front of a person's home).
117. See Browne, supra note 10, at 520 (arguing that "[e]xtension of the captive-
audience doctrine to the workplace, where workers often spend one-third to one-half of
their waking hours, would leave very little time for the free expression that under our
system is supposed to be the rule rather than the exception"); Gerard, supra note 10, at
1031 ("The captive audience concept has been employed to sustain restrictions of speech
only when the speech somehow intruded into the home. A workplace is not a home.").
118. In fact, in discussing the captive audience theory, both Browne and Gerard fall
back on the argument that Title VII is viewpoint-based. Browne, supra note 10, at 518;
Gerard, supra note 10, at 1031-32. For reasons why the viewpoint-neutrality requirement
does not apply to Title VII, see supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
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effect caused by the speech restrictions of Title VII, it is apparent that
the need for equality in the workplace is paramount.
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